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1959] NOTES
Another change in the present law will be a broadening of inter-
vention to include Louisiana's present third opposition.22 Under
the proposed Code of Civil Procedure an intervener may join
with the plaintiff "in demanding the same or similar relief
against the defendant," unite with the defendant "in resisting
the plaintiff's demand," or oppose both the plaintiff and defend-
ant. These rules will probably provide a more definite test of
the interest required to intervene without taking away the trial
judge's right to use his discretion in certain cases.24
The adoption of the federal rule allowing the intervention to
stand even though the main demand has been dismissed will ef-
fect a legislative overruling of cases which the court found it
necessary to distinguish in the instant case. At the same time
it will very appropriately result in the legislative adoption of the
rule'of the instant case without retaining the restriction imposed
by the court.
C. A. King, II
ROYALTY PER SE - WHO BENEFITS UPON ITS
PRESCRIPTION
In 1943, Niblett Farms, owner of a tract of land with the
minerals thereon, conveyed a 1/24th royalty interest to various
persons. In 1948, Niblett Farms sold the land to the defendant
Broussard, retaining a 3/32nd royalty interest which included
the outstanding 1/24th royalty interest, and reserving 1/2 of all
the minerals. The act of sale stipulated that in the event of pro-
duction 2/3 of the total royalty interest was payable out of the
mineral interests held by the vendor and 1/3 out of that held by
intervention, and there need be no independent ground of federal jurisdiction."
Id. paragraph 24.07 at 32. Intervention of right is provided for the case in which
a person will be "adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of prop-
erty in the custody of the court." Id. paragraph 24.08 at 35; paragraph 24.09 at
45. An applicant may be permitted to intervene if his claim has some question
of law or fact in common with the main suit. Id. paragraph 24.10 at 59. The
court exercises its discretion in these cases to determine whether the intervention
will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication. As regards the problem considered
in the instant case, under the federal rules, the intervention does not fall with the
dismissal of the plaintiff's action. Federal Rule 41(a) (2). This source was par-
tially relied on for the rule of the Louisiana Law Institute in the Proposed Louisi-
ana Code of Civil Procedure.
. 22. Proposed Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure art. 1092; LA. CODE OF PRAC-
TICE art. 396 (1870), now LA. R.S. 13:396 (1950).
g3. Proposed Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure art. 1091.
24. Id. art. 1091, comment (a).
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the vendee. The act further provided that the 1/24th royalty
would revert to its grantor upon its termination. Defendants
designated as the "Hawthorne Group" now hold all mineral in-
terests formerly owned by Niblett Farms. Plaintiff completed
a producing well on the property in 1955 and instituted a con-
cursus proceeding to determine the disposition of funds accruing
to the disputed 1/24th royalty interest. It was conceded that ten
years elapsed without production since the sale of the 1/24th
royalty interest. Broussard contended that as owner of the land
he was entitled to the funds. The "Hawthorne Group" claimed
the funds, arguing that reversionary royalty rights were legal
and even if not, that they were entitled to either: (a) 2/3 of the
funds on the premise that the interest must be divided in pro-
portion to the burden of payment imposed on the parties by their
agreement;' or (b) 1/2 of the funds on the premise that the
interest must be divided in proportion to the mineral ownership.
The trial court held that there could be no reversionary royalty
rights in Louisiana and apportioned the fund in proportion to
the burden of payment. On appeal, the Supreme Court on orig-
inal hearing, held, reversed as to the distribution of the fund.
Broussard, as owner of the land was entitled to the full interest.
On first rehearing, held, reversed. The 1/24th royalty interest
upon termination passed out of the picture and left the "Haw-
thorne Group" with a full 3/32nd royalty interest and therefore
they were entitled to the funds. On second rehearing, held, re-
versed. The 1/24th royalty was a charge on the entire mineral
estate, and the fund must therefore be divided in proportion to
the mineral ownership of the parties. Union Oil and Gas Co. v.
Broussard, 112 So.2d 96 (La. 1959).
Louisiana recognizes various interests in connection with
minerals underneath the surface of the soil. The instant case
deals with two of these interests - the "mineral servitude" and
the so-called "royalty per se." The "mineral servitude" interest
arises under sale or reservation of the minerals by the landowner
when he sells the land. It is in the nature of a servitude grant-
ing the owner thereof the right to explore for and extract min-
erals from the land subject thereto.2 It is well-settled law that
this servitude is subject to the ten-year prescription liberandi
1. Pertinent portions of the agreement are quoted in Union Oil & Gas Corp.
v. Broussard, 112 So.2d 96, 97 (La. 1959).
2. Horn v. Skelly Oil Co., 224 La. 709, 70 So.2d 657 (1954) ; Wemple v. Na-
bors Oil and Gas Co., 154 La. 483, 97 So. 666 (1923) ; Frost-Johnson Lumber Co.
v. Saling's Heirs, 150 La. 756, 91 So. 207 (1922).
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causa for nonuseY In the absence of interruption or suspension, 4
this liberative prescription extinguishes the servitude; and the
mineral rights flowing therefrom are accordingly returned to
the land.5 The second type interest dealt with is of chief concern
in this Note. This interest has, among others, been termed "roy-
alty per se,"'6 "landowner's royalty,"7 and "royalty properly so-
called." 8 The term "royalty" in itself is susceptible to diverse
application. Thus, Professor Daggett states:
"It is the price paid for the privilege of exercising the
right to explore. If that right is granted by a lease contract,
it is the whole or part of the consideration for the lease. If
that right is granted or reserved by a sale, it is the considera-
tion in part or whole of the sale. Royalty in itself cannot be
used to designate the fundamental right which is being dealt
with but only to indicate the percentage, the price, the rent,
the consideration attached to or proceeding out of the right
or that may proceed from it during its existence. The roy-
alty depends upon the continued existence of the right to
which it is an appendage."9 (Emphasis added.)
This description has been approved by the Louisiana Supreme
Court.'0 Thus, it seems clear that the nature and type of royalty
being dealt with must be dependent upon the contract in which
it appears. In connection with the royalty here concerned, here-
after designated as royalty per se, the same writer above stated
in 1939 that "If the word is used in the contract to indicate a
passive interest in possible production, without the leasing or
3. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 783, 789 (1870) ; Palmer Corp. v. Moore, 171 La.
774, 132 So. 229 (1930), and authorities there cited. See also DAGGETT, Louisi-
ANA MINERAL RIGHiTS 53 (rev. ed. 1949).
4. Prescription can be interrupted by user. Taylor v. Dunn, 233 La. 617, 97
So.2d 415 (1957) (user by whom) ; Mays v. Hansboro, 222 La. 557, 64 So.2d 232
(1953) (non-contiguous tracts) ; McMurrey v. Gray, 216 La. 904, 45 So.2d 73
(1949) (good faith user - dry hole). Prescription can also be interrupted by
acknowledgment. Union Oil Co. v. Touchet, 229 La. 316, 86 So.2d 50 (1956) ;
Wise v. Watkins, 222 La. 493, 62 So.2d 653 (1952). As to the possibility of in-
terruption by acceptance of benefits or ratification, see Goree v. Sanders, 203 La.
859, 14 So.2d 744 (1943). For possibility of interruption of prescription by suit,
see LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3518 (1870) ; Perkins v. Long-Bell Petroleum Co., 227
La. 1044, 81 So.2d 389 (1955). For the suspension of prescription, see LA. R.S.
9:5805 (1950) ; Boddie v. Drewitt, 229 La. 1017, 87 So.2d 516 (1956).
5. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 789, 3546 (1870); Palmer Corp. v. Moore, 171 La.
774, 132 So. 229 (1930) ; Lee v. Giauque, 154 La. 491, 97 So. 669 (1923).
6. See the discussion of all three terms in DAGGETT, LOUISIANA MINERAL
RIGTs 258 (rev. ed. 1949).
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Id. at 247.
10. Vincent v. Bullock, 192 La. 1, 15, 187 So. 35, 39 (1939).
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production privilege usually inherent in the right, then a new
and as yet uninterpreted situation appears upon which the court
has not declared itself fully."" Soon thereafter, however, as
pointed out by the Supreme Court,12 the identical situation re-
ferred to by the writer above was presented in Vincent v. Bul-
lock. 3 The royalty right there involved was a passive interest
in possible production, and the court held that this reservation
of the right to share in the proceeds only as distinguished from
the right to explore was (1) a "real obligation" which passed
with the property into the hands of the present owner ;14 and (2)
a real right imposed upon the land subject to the prescription
of ten years under the Civil Code. The court further held that
the obligation was subject to a suspensive condition, i.e., that
the event- production -had to happen within the ten-year
period.' The distinction between this royalty per se interest
and a mineral servitude seems clear under the cases. Unlike the
servitude owner, the royalty per se owner does not possess the
right of ingress or egress, nor does he have the right of explora-
tion.' ( Indeed, he may not even force the landowner to lease the
land for development so as perhaps to realize his expectations.' 7
Hence, it can be said that the royalty per se interest merely im-
parts to its owner a right to share in the production if and
when obtained.' The court has stated that the royalty right is
but an appendage of the right of the mineral owner,'9 and may
be granted by either the landowner, or the mineral owner when
the minerals have been sold.20 It is also settled that the royalty
11. DAGGETT, LOUISIANA MINERAL RIGiTS 176 (1939).
12. St. Martin Land Co. v. Pinckney, 212 La. 605, 615, 33 So.2d 169, 172
(1947).
13. Vincent v. Bullock, 192 La. 1, 1.87 So. 35, 39 (1939).
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. The distinction between the two types of interests affecting minerals is
now-well settled. Strictly speaking, the "mineral right" interest is in the nature
of a servitude granting the owner thereof the right to explore for and extract
minerals from the land subject thereto; whereas a "royalty" right or interest
merely imparts to its owner a right to share in production if and when obtained
by the owner or lessee of a mineral right affecting land. Horn v. Skelly Oil Co.,
224 La. 709, 70 So.2d 657 (1954) ; Union Sulphur Co. v. Andrau, 217 La. 662,
47 So.2d 38 (1950).
17. Spiner v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 94 F. Supp. 273 (W.D. La. 1950).
18. Vincent v. Bullock, 192 La. 1, 187 So. 35 (1939).
19. "Of these two rights it has been correctly said by one of the authorities
on the oil and gas law of this state that the royalty right is but an appendage of
the right of the mineral owner." Continental Oil Co. v. Landry, 215 La. 518,
526, 41 So.2d 73, 75 (1949). See also Wier v. Glassel, 216 La. 828, 44 So.2d 882
(1950).
20. The owner of land under the usual form of lease is entitled to a share of
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right is an inferior and lesser right than the mineral servitude.2 1
Two new and as yet uninterpreted situations faced the court
in the instant case. First, should parties be allowed to deal in
reversionary royalty rights? Second, who is to benefit and to
what extent upon prescription of the royalty per se - the land-
owner or the mineral servitude owner? These two issues will be
discussed in the order presented.
The court had less difficulty in disposing of the first issue.
It pointed out that in Hicks v. Clark 22 it had refused to recognize
and give effect to the reservation of a reversionary right in a
mineral right or servitude. The reason assigned for the rejec-
tion of reversionary interests in mineral rights in the Hicks case
was that it "would cause the land to be burdened with a minhral
servitude for a longer period than 10 years without user, con-
trary to the public policy of this state that the right to explore
for oil, gas and other minerals in the absence of use reverts to
the land in a period of 10 years." 3 The court in the instant case
reiterated the fact that the royalty right was but an appendage
to the mineral servitude and that the mineral servitude by its
nature is superior to the royalty right. They then concluded
that: "If the reservation of a reversionary interest in the su-
perior right is contrary to the public policy of this state, it fol-
lows that the reservation of the reversion of the inferior right
is likewise contrary to public policy. ' 24 As added emphasis, the
court cited an earlier holding2 , to the effect that when royalty
prescribes it ceases to exist, and there is nothing to revert. This,
in the writer's mind, merits reproduction of the following state-
ment:
"The Court's observation that there was nothing to 're-
vert' after prescription had run against the royalty seems
production termed landowner's royalty or Vincent v. Bullock royalty. He may
alienate a part of his royalty to set up a right in a person not a party to the
lease which the owner of the new right loses in the event of failure of production
in ten years. The same right may be granted by a mineral owner, and its loss by
unsuccessful drilling, which maintains the servitude of the mineral owner, benefits
the mineral owner rather than the landowner. Arkansas Fuel Oil Co. v. Sanders,
224 La. 448, 69 So.2d 745 (1953).
21. Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Guillory, 212 La. 646, 33 So.2d 182 (1947)
St. Martin Land Co. v. Pinckney, 212 La. 605, 33 So.2d 182 (1947) ; Union Sul-
phur Co. v. Lognion, 212 La. 632, 33 So.2d 178 (1947) ; Vincent v. Bullock, 192
La. 1, 187 So. 35 (1939).
22. Hicks v. Clark, 225 La. 133, 72 So.2d 322 (1954).
23. Id. at 142, 72 So.2d at 325.
24. Union Oil & Gas Corp. v. Broussard, 237 La. 660, 711, 112 So.2d 96, 114
(1959).
25. Arkansas Fuel Oil Co. v. Sanders, 224 La. 448, 69 So.2d 745 (1953).
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perhaps to be an over-simplification of the situation. Cer-
tainly the debtor gains and the creditor loses in every case
of a like nature so that something of value passes whether
the word 'revert' is accurate or not. When the burden or debt
of the land to the servitude owner is wiped away by prescrip-
tion the word 'revert' has been acceptable. In the instant
case, the servitude owner having assumed the debt to the roy-
alty owner obviously gained when the royalty right pre-
scribed." 2
The second issue proved much more difficult than the first
and necessitated five hearings27 for its final disposition. This
was due in part to the difficulty involved in interpreting the
pertinent parts of the act of sale between Niblett Farms and
Broussard. This deed (after providing that the vendor retained
a 3/32nd royalty including an outstanding 1/24th royalty and
that the vendor reserved 1/2 of all minerals) further stipulated
that: "(c) Two thirds (2/3) of the amount of outstanding roy-
alties hereinabove excepted from this conveyance or a total of
2/32nds of all of the oil, gas and other minerals produced from
said land shall be chargeable to and deducted from the rights of
the vendor in the land herein described." A recapitulation of the
court's various holdings relative to the effect of the above pro-
vision will prove helpful. In the original hearing, the Supreme
Court interpreted the provision to mean that the 1/24th royalty
was meant to be a portion of the 3/32nd royalty reservation.
Thus, when the 1/24th royalty prescribed and passed out of the
picture, the vendor was left with only a 5/96th royalty; and all
funds attributable to the 1/24th royalty went to Broussard as
landowner. On first rehearing, the court stressed the fact that
parties are to be given utmost freedom of contract. Consequently
they held that the above provision meant that the 1/24th royalty
was included in the royalty interest chargeable against the vend-
or's servitude. The court then concluded that when the 1/24th
royalty prescribed, it ceased to be a burden on the immovable
to which it was attached, namely, the servitude reserved by Nib-
lett Farms. Therefore, the interest which bore the burden of the
royalty per se should benefit upon its prescription; and accord-
ingly the fund was given to the mineral owners. On second re-
hearing, the court after a careful review of all pertinent facts ar-
26. The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1953-1954 Term -
Mineral Rights, 15 LOUISIANA LAw REVIEW 301 (1955).
27. The writer includes the trial court hearing, the hearing in the court of
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rived at what seems to be a correct decision. The court held
that at the time the 1/24th royalty interest was sold Niblett
Farms owned a/ of the minerals and, therefore, the 1/24th roy-
alty became an appendage of all of the minerals. Consequently
all of the minerals were relieved of its charge upon prescription.
The stipulation relative to payment of the 1/24th royalty interest
was held entirely without effect in the determination of the case.
Two reasons were given by the court for this result. First, the
stipulation was ineffective as to the royalty owners due to the
absence of privity of contract. Second, the court pointed out that
in the event of production prior to the accrual of prescription
Niblett could recover only a 3/32nd royalty minus the 1/24th
royalty. Hence, to allow Niblett (or its successors) to receive a
full 3/32nd royalty after the accrual of prescription would in ef-
fect require a recognition of a reversionary right in Niblett as to
the 1/24th. This, the court felt, would be against the public
policy of the state, and therefore, the provision must be ignored.
Thus, the court held that each was to profit in accordance with
his mineral ownership, which left Broussard with 1/2 of the
funds and the "Hawthorne Group" with 1/2 of the funds.
The court's reasoning relative to the disposition of the funds
appears sound. Royalty per se is a right created out of the min-
eral estate2s and achieves fruition only upon the discovery of
minerals. It is an appendage of the right of the mineral owner
and is dependent upon the continued existence of the right to
which it is appended. 29 It may seem axiomatic that an append-
ed, subsidiary right will, upon termination, revert, accrue, or
accrete to the primary right from which it was derived. Indeed,
language in an earlier case is in accord with this premise with
respect to royalty.30 Even if it is deemed advisable to adhere to
the "passing out of the picture" theory rather than talk in terms
of reverting, it is equally clear that the practical effect is to
allow benefits resulting from prescribed royalty to return to the
appeal, and the three hearings in the Supreme Court.
28. Vincent v. Bullock, 192 La. 1, 15, 187 So. 35, 39 (1939) quotes DAGGETT,
LOUISIANA MINERAL RIGHTS 247 (1939) on this approvingly.
29. See note 19 supra.
30. "If that agreement did create or grant a royalty interest in Adler Com-
pany it was only a conditional obligation effective in event of production and this
obligation lapsed on July 28, 1937. Not being a servitude, no production having
been realized, there was nothing to revert to the land owner and the Louisiana
Investment Company and its assigns continued to be the sole owners of the whole
mineral servitude." Delta Refining Co. v. Bankhead, 225 La. 422, 438, 73 So.2d
302, 308 (1954).
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source from which the royalty was derived. The source being
established as the mineral estate, it follows that the ultimate
recipients will be the owners of the minerals, and not the land-
owner. This is so because they were burdened by the royalty
while alive and of necessity reap the advantages when the bur-
den passes out of the picture. To say that the prescribed royalty
right reverts to the owner of the land simply because he is owner
of the land would lead to unnatural and inconsistent results. For
example, as pointed out by the court, suppose A is owner of the
land and all minerals, and sells all minerals to B. One year later
B sells royalty per se to C. Eight years after the creation of the
servitude, a bona fide drilling operation is conducted which re-
sults in a dry hole. This drilling would of course interrupt pre-
scription as to the mineral servitude but not as to the royalty
per se. Now, ten years after the royalty per se sale, could it
logically be said that the royalty would then revert to A who
owns no minerals? The very creation and continued existence of
royalty per se is absolutely dependent on the presence of a min-
eral estate to. which it is appended. Therefore, when there is an
independent termination of the royalty per se by reason of pre-
scription, any benefit to be derived due to such termination must
inure to the mineral owner because it is the mineral interest
which is relieved of the charge, not the land. To rule overwise
would in effect be to regrant to the landowner that which he has
already sold, viz., all his minerals.
There remains one issue to be decided once it is accepted that
only the mineral owners are to benefit upon the prescription of
royalty per se. This is the determination of, in what proportion
the benefit returns when several persons own the mineral estate
against which the royalty was charged. In the absence of con-
trary agreement between the parties, it would appear elementary
that the mineral owners would benefit in accordance with their
percentage of mineral ownership. In the instant case, when the
royalty was first sold, the owner of the land by reason of owner-
ship of the minerals owed the duty to pay in the event produc-
tion was realized. When the land was subsequently sold, the
mineral estate was equally divided, the vendor reserving 1/2 and
the vendee acquiring 1/2. Therefore, the duty of payment on
these facts would rest in equal proportion on the vendor and the
vendee. However, in the instant case, an agreement was present
which affected the burden of payment. Leaving aside possible
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questions relating to the interpretation of the agreement, it can
be assumed that the "Hawthorne Group" did in fact carry 2/3
of the burden of payment of the 1/24th royalty with Broussard
having the remaining 1/3 burden. Under the writer's apprecia-
tion of the decision in this respect, the court held the agreement
ineffective insofar as the determination of the question of who
was to benefit. But, they did not hold the agreement void ab
initio. To the contrary, the court expressly stated that the par-
ties would have been bound in that respect had production been
obtained within the prescriptive period. This seems to present
an inconsistency in the court's reasoning. For, if it be said that
the benefits must return in proportion to the burden cast on the
parties, it could easily be said that the burden here was 2/3 and
1/3 on the "Hawthorne Group" and Broussard respectively,
rather than an equal 1/2. Be that as it may, it is submitted that
the burden imposed on the mineral estate by the royalty as an
appended right, as contra-distinguished from the burden of pay-
ment imposed on the parties by agreement, should be controlling.
To be sure, the parties' intentions should be controlling when at
all possible. However, when such intent is contrary to the public
policy of the state, then that intent must be subordinated. As
postulated by the court, to allow the parties to alter the manner
of benefits springing from prescribed royalty by simply adopt-
ing different burdens of payment would be in effect to recognize
reversionary rights. Therefore, it is suggested that any state-
ment made by the court not necessary to the holding and which
is inconsistent with this principle should be considered mere
obiter dictum. It is submitted that the court in its final opinion
rendered a satisfactory and desirable decision. Having already
held that reversionary mineral interests in mineral servitudes
were prohibited, and being mindful of the fact that royalty was
a lesser right than the mineral interest, the court soundly struck
down the attempted reversionary royalty interest presented in
this case. Next, relying on the well-settled rule that royalty is
an appendage to the mineral servitude, the court correctly con-
cluded that, upon its prescription, any benefit as a result there-
of must of necessity flow to the owners of the mineral servitude.
Charley Quienalty
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